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The international climate discussion is not bogged down by a lack of data. It is broken by extremisms that share a common root: arrogance.
On one side, a technocratic alarmism that absolutises models and turns probabilistic scenarios into revealed certainties and oracles. On the other, a reactive denialism that uses uncertainty as a pretext to ignore direct physical evidence.
Both extremes claim omniscience. Both arise from attributing more certainty than one possesses. And because of this, both generate real, avoidable costs.
When alarmism becomes expensive
Poorly designed climate policy is not harmless.
Germany accelerated the closure of its nuclear power plants following the Fukushima accident (2011). The historic anti-nuclear stance of the Green Party and its electoral weight decisively influenced the acceleration of the phase-out, in a context of strong social sensitivity and political calculation by the government, within the broader framework of the climate energy transition (Energiewende). This hasty political decision omitted sufficient technical sequencing and, in the short term, increased dependence on coal and gas. This shift generated an estimated social cost of between 3,000 and 8,000 million euros annually and added approximately 730 million additional tonnes of CO₂ to the atmosphere, equivalent to a bill of 57,000 million euros — about 1,390 euros per household — in addition to causing nearly 1,100 premature deaths annually associated with increased local air pollution. (Jarvis et al., 2022; Anthropocene Institute, 2025).
Similarly, in Portugal and Spain, the abandonment of coal was due to economic infeasibility and the rising cost of carbon under the EU ETS, within the framework of the European climate agenda. In Portugal, the closure of Sines and Pego in 2021 eliminated several hundred direct jobs, supported by European funds. Spain, on the other hand, closed 26 operations in 2018, affecting around 1,600 workers and receiving €791 million from the Just Transition Fund to reconvert regions such as Asturias and León. However, the World Resources Institute describes the transition in the mining basins as “mainly reactive,” in areas where some municipalities had already experienced depopulation of up to 40% (WRI, 2021; EC, 2019; Alves Dias et al., 2018; ITJ, 2022). Even the Spanish socialist vice president at that time, Teresa Ribera, acknowledged a “hasty exit from coal in the energy mix,” highlighting the tension between climate urgency and the real capacity for territorial adaptation. (Diario de Teruel, 2020; Barreira et al., 2020; UNDRR, 2022). Despite the billions of euros mobilised in Spain for green jobs, the transition ended up eroding its legitimacy due to abrupt social costs.
These are cases where the climate intention was right, but the rushed execution caused socio-economic and political damage that could have been avoided with better design. Balancing environmental success requires structural design and reasonable timelines. The problem is not reducing emissions. The problem is confusing speed with virtue.
When denial also comes at a cost
The rejection and inaction are not without cost either.
The reactive denialism —expressed in “drill, baby, drill”— not only drives fossil expansion but also finances it. In the United States, the law One Big Beautiful Bill (2025), according to Oil Change, it could expand by USD 40 billion in new subsidies to the fossil fuel industry over the next decade, in addition to existing schemes that already involve USD 34.8 billion annually. In this context —along with increased electricity demand for AI and a cold winter— its emissions rose by 2.4% in 2025 (Oil Change, 2025; American Progress, 2026; Rhodium Group 2026).
The physical costs are increasing in parallel with these policies, in a context where climate vulnerability and exposure have already been on the rise. According to NOAA (NCEI), losses from climate disasters in the US rose (in constant 2025 dollars) from approximately USD 220 billion throughout the 1980s to nearly USD 1 trillion in the 2010s, and between 2020 and 2025, they have already totalled USD 861.7 billion, bringing the total since 1980 to over USD 3 trillion (trillions) (NOAA, 2026; Climate Central, 2026). The current annual average exceeds USD 140 billion, more than six times that of the 1980s.
On a global scale, the trajectory is similar: losses increased from approximately USD 600 billion in the 1980s to around USD 2.2 trillion in the 2010s, accumulating USD 1.96 trillion between 2020 and 2025, and totalling USD 7.2 trillion from 1980 to today. The annual average rose from USD 60 billion in 1980 to approximately USD 280 billion currently. These figures as a proportion of global GDP have quadrupled over 45 years, rising from about 0.1% to around 0.4% annually. (EM-DAT; IPCC AR6 WGII; Munich Re, 2023 y 2026; Ritchie et al., 2022).
Although part of the increase is due to greater exposure of populations in vulnerable areas, the IPCC concludes with high confidence that global warming intensifies heatwaves and extreme precipitation (IPCC AR6 WG1 y WGII). The United States accounts for around 45% of global monetised losses, confirming that inaction does not save money: it transforms physical risk into an exponential liability.
Getting out of the pendulum: back to the basis and its definition
To overcome the ideological clash, we need to return to the beginning, as a structural criterion.
Pollution is not a metaphor. It is an operational concept.
Pollution occurs when three conditions are present:
- An alteration is introduced in the environment.
- Adverse effects on life are verified.
- His natural capacity for assimilation is exceeded.
The question is straightforward: do these classical conditions apply in the climate case?
First condition: Is there an introduced alteration?
Yes.
For at least 800,000 years, atmospheric CO₂ fluctuated between approximately 180 and 280 ppm. Today it exceeds nearly double that range, above 420 ppm, and is on the rise. And this additional CO₂ is mostly a product of human activity. (Keeling Curve, 2026; IPCC AR6 WG1).
The answer does not lie in models or simulations, but in chemistry and stoichiometry.
The fossil carbon is naturally depleted in certain isotopes (¹³C and ¹⁴C). By massively burning coal, oil, and gas, we inject CO₂ with that specific isotopic signature into the atmosphere. (Efecto Suess).
The measurements of the isotopic composition of atmospheric carbon in different recent periods show a systematic decrease in ¹³C and a dilution of ¹⁴C, consistent with the incorporation of fossil carbon. This has been verified through calculations based on isotopic mass balance and inverse modelling. (Graven et al., 2020). Furthermore, the drop in atmospheric oxygen has been measured and verified in stoichiometric proportion to combustion (Keeling et al., 1992-1996-1998; IPCC AR6 WG1).
This is not a statistical correlation. It is direct observation and physical-chemical accounting.
The excess of CO₂ has our footprint, and here ends the discussion about the main source of the recent increase. It is not a weak inference. It is direct chemical traceability.
We have been introducing the alteration.
Second condition: are there verifiable adverse effects?
Yes.
The global average temperature increased by ~1.1 °C compared to the pre-industrial period, due to the greenhouse gas effect of CO₂ and other gases (IPCC AR6 WG1). The rate of warming since 1970 is the fastest in at least two millennia.
Heatwaves are more frequent and intense in multiple regions. Extreme precipitation increases by approximately 7% for every 1°C of warming (Clausius-Clapeyron), in line with basic physics and empirical observations (IPCC AR6 WG1).
The sea level is rising faster, with its rate of increase moving from ~1.4 mm/year (early 20th century) to over 3.7 mm/year recently (IPCC AR6 WG1).
The material and economic damages show a clearly increasing trend, as indicated by the previously cited historical series.
We are not talking about isolated episodes, but about events and signals consistent with a measurable energy and physical imbalance. Nor is it a rhetorical inference: attribution science and well-established physical mechanisms (Clausius-Clapeyron) have demonstrated that global warming is already increasing the probability and intensity of the mentioned extremes with high confidence (IPCC AR6 WG1 y WGII). To deny it today is to ignore both basic physics and the comparative statistical evidence.
Third condition: Was the capacity for assimilation exceeded?
Yes.
Oceans and the biosphere absorb about half of the annual emissions. The rest accumulates (IPCC AR6 WG1).
If the natural capacity were not exceeded, the concentration would not increase sustainably.
Moreover, in the fastest natural transitions of the last 800,000 years of the paleoclimatic record (the last glacial cycle), atmospheric CO₂ increased on average between 0.002 and 0.004 ppm/year, and at most by 0.01 ppm/year. In recent decades, the average increase has been around 2 to 3 ppm annually, which is between 200 and 1,500 times faster (IPCC AR6 WG1).
The problem is not just the magnitude, it is the speed of accumulation. We are not facing a variation comparable to previous cycles. We are introducing a disturbance at an unprecedented rate in the recent record of the climate system.
That does not imply knowing exactly how each region will evolve in each decade. It means recognising that the scale and pace of intervention are extraordinary, and that the environment's capacity for assimilation is widely exceeded.
When the rate of introduction consistently exceeds the capacity for absorption, by definition we are facing a contamination of the system: the excess does not dissipate, it accumulates.
Technical conclusion
The three classic conditions of pollution, therefore, are present. And it is us. We are introducing a disturbance, with verified adverse effects on life that far exceed the capacity of ecosystems to assimilate.
It is not neutral variability. It is "climatic contamination" in a systemic sense.
And that directly links us to the underlying problem that touches on a basic moral principle that can be expressed in two words:
Do not pollute.
Prudence in the face of limits
Saint Thomas of Aquinas defined prudence as straight reason applied to action (prudentia est recta ratio agibilium). It is to deliberate according to the truth and to act according to the good, for the sake of the good itself, recognising the limits.
Arrogance, on the other hand, is the disorder by which one attributes to oneself more than one deserves.
In the international climate political debate, there is arrogance when it is believed that we can redesign the planetary system with exhaustive knowledge. When the focus is on absolutising climate models and projections as if they provide infallible control.
And on the other side, there is also arrogance when, knowing that we are disrupting the planetary balance, one decides to ignore solid physical evidence and continue as if nothing were happening. When the uncertainty, fallibility, and provisionality of science are confused with harmlessness.
Prudence demands something different: to act according to the known truth and within recognised limits. “Playing God” and attempting to manipulate variables on a planetary scale with an undue confidence in our actual knowledge, or hastily intervening in an open and complex system without acknowledging limits, is not prudence.
Neither absolutise knowledge.
Nor disregard the evidence.
Return the discussion to its axis
Prudence is neither panic nor is it denial. It is recognising that intervening in a complex system has consequences that we do not fully control.
If the warming were to be less than projected, reducing an anomalous cumulative disturbance would still be rational.
If it were to be greater, inaction would have confused uncertainty with harmlessness. It would have implied an excess of confidence in the face of a risk whose physical basis had already been demonstrated.
In both cases, the principle remains:
Do not pollute.
Do not introduce cumulative disturbances that we know alter the functional balance of the system that supports our habitability, and we do not know what new equilibrium it will lead us to, but we do know that the path is being traumatic.
Not out of fear.
Not for ideology.
Not out of devotion to a model.
But out of prudence, because proper conduct requires us not to disrupt what we did not create and must take care of.
Science will continue to refine figures.
Politics will continue to discuss instruments.
The right reason in action is prior to both.
There begins a truly orderly climate discussion.